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In 1980s New Jersey, a couple longing for a child signed an agreement with a woman who was willing to act as their surrogate. But after the baby was born, what had begun as a shared understanding turned into a legal battle that lasted nearly two years. This was the Baby M case, a dispute that gripped the entire country.
William Stern and his wife, Elizabeth, had put off having children for financial and academic reasons. Later, Elizabeth learned that she might have multiple sclerosis. Worried that pregnancy could seriously damage her health, she gave up the idea of carrying a child herself.
For William, the decision was especially painful. Most of his family had died in the Holocaust, and as its only survivor, he badly wanted to carry on the family line. The couple considered adoption, but the long wait, along with worries that their ages and religious backgrounds might stand in the way, led them to look for other options.

Through an advertisement placed by the Infertility Center of New York, they met Mary Beth Whitehead. Mary already had two children. She said she wanted to help a family that could not have a child, and she hoped the payment would also improve life for her own family.
After meeting and talking it over, they decided to go ahead. On February 6, 1985, William signed an agreement with Mary and her husband, Richard. Elizabeth did not sign as a party to the contract. Under its terms, Mary would become pregnant through artificial insemination using William’s sperm. After giving birth, she would hand the baby over to the Sterns and cooperate in ending her parental rights so that Elizabeth could adopt the child. Richard agreed to take the steps needed to overcome the legal presumption that he was the baby’s father. William would pay Mary ten thousand dollars and, under a separate contract, a brokerage fee of seven thousand five hundred dollars to the Infertility Center of New York.
On March 27, 1986, a baby girl was born. Almost from that moment, however, Mary knew she could not bear to give her up.
Three days later, she nonetheless kept her promise and handed the baby over to the Sterns. The next day, she came back to their home in deep distress. She begged to take the baby home for just one week, promising to return her afterward. Fearing that Mary might take her own life, and believing she would keep her word, the Sterns agreed.
The week passed. The baby did not come back.
On May 5, 1986, the Sterns filed suit, asking the court to enforce the agreement, order the baby’s return, terminate Mary’s parental rights, and allow Elizabeth to adopt her.
After the court issued a temporary custody order, the Whiteheads fled to Florida with the baby. For roughly the next three months, they moved among about twenty hotels and homes to avoid being found. Eventually, acting under a court order, police took the baby from her maternal grandparents’ home and returned her to New Jersey, where she was placed with the Sterns.
The baby was back, but the fight was not over.
The trial began in January 1987. After thirty-two days of hearings spread over more than two months, the trial court ruled on March 31 that the surrogacy contract was valid. It awarded William sole custody, terminated Mary’s parental rights, and approved Elizabeth’s adoption of the child.
Mary appealed, and the case went to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
On February 3, 1988, the Supreme Court reached a very different conclusion. The surrogacy contract violated state law and public policy, and was therefore invalid and unenforceable. Mary’s parental rights were restored, and Elizabeth’s adoption was set aside.

But invalidating the contract did not mean the baby would go back to Mary. Applying the best-interests-of-the-child standard, the Supreme Court still awarded custody to William, the biological father. Mary’s visitation rights were sent back to the lower court to be decided.
Almost three years had passed between the signing of the agreement and the Supreme Court’s decision.
The case drew extraordinary national attention. Leading newspapers, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times, covered the controversy, and the three major television networks, NBC, ABC, and CBS, reported on the trial and the court rulings. In her 2007 book, Surrogate Motherhood and the Politics of Reproduction, Susan Markens, a sociologist who studies reproduction and gender, cited two surveys that show how far the case reached. A Gallup poll taken during the 1987 trial found that ninety-three percent of respondents had heard of the Baby M case. In a separate Roper poll, seventy-nine percent said they had read or heard enough about the case to feel informed about it.
Looking back at this story from forty years ago, it is easy to see how different it is from surrogacy in the United States today. The first point to clarify is that Mary used her own egg. She was both the woman who carried the pregnancy and the child’s biological mother, which is known as traditional surrogacy. Today, the dominant form is gestational surrogacy, and the key difference is that the carrier does not use her own egg. Instead, an egg from the intended mother or a donor is fertilized outside the body, and the resulting embryo is transferred to the carrier’s uterus. She therefore has no genetic connection to the child. Still, this should not be reduced to a simple contrast between past and present. Traditional surrogacy still exists, though it is no longer the dominant form, and it may involve consent after the birth and adoption proceedings, so the legal process for gestational surrogacy cannot simply be copied over to it.
Second, who should be a party to the contract? Here, Mary and her husband both signed the agreement. Elizabeth, the woman who intended to become the child’s mother, did not sign as a contracting party; she planned to establish her legal motherhood through adoption after the birth. By contrast, properly structured gestational surrogacy arrangements today put more emphasis on having both intended parents sign the agreement together with the surrogate, so that everyone’s legal status, rights, and responsibilities are settled in advance.
Third, there is the question of the contract’s validity. If it had no legal force, why could it be signed in the first place, and why did the trial court uphold it? And if it was valid, why did the Supreme Court reject it? The two courts’ decisions show that they disagreed over how the existing law should apply. The trial court reasoned that the legislature had not contemplated surrogacy when it passed adoption and related laws, so those provisions did not govern this agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed: calling an arrangement surrogacy did not put it beyond the reach of existing law.
In other words, the validity of the contract was contested rather than settled. This helps explain why so much of the work in surrogacy arrangements in the United States today happens before the agreement is signed. Negotiating, preparing, and signing the contract is a demanding process, and the surrogate and the intended parents must each have their own lawyer to guide them through it, step by step. The aim is to make sure that if a disagreement arises while the contract is being carried out, the agreement stands on solid legal ground and can be upheld consistently. The gradual development and effective implementation of surrogacy laws in many states have also strengthened the standing of these contracts. This is one of the features that sets American surrogacy apart from arrangements in other countries.
Fourth, the Supreme Court did not reject every possible arrangement in which a woman helped someone else have a child. It expressly distinguished a situation in which a woman carried a child voluntarily and without payment, and was not bound by an enforceable agreement requiring her to surrender the baby. Such an arrangement, the court said, would not violate New Jersey law as it then stood. The implication was that a surrogate could hardly be paid, but she would keep the right to change her mind after the birth without being forced to give up the child. For intended parents, that naturally carried risk. Nor is unpaid surrogacy necessarily the way most women willing to help others become parents would choose to do it. This helps explain why that model is no longer the most popular form of surrogacy today.
From this perspective, two conclusions follow.

The first is that priority should be given to gestational surrogacy, in which the carrier does not use her own egg. A central conflict in Baby M was that the surrogate was also the child’s genetic mother. That tie can deepen emotional attachment and the physical and psychological strain involved, and it makes legal parentage harder to resolve. Gestational surrogacy makes the parental relationships clear from the outset, protects the interests of both sides, and reduces the chance of disputes. The second is that surrogacy contracts need a clear legal basis and a consistent approach to enforceability. Key parties, including the intended parents, should be named in the agreement, and the contract should be recognized consistently under the applicable law, so that a reversal like the one in Baby M, where the trial court upheld the contract and the highest court rejected it, does not happen again. The aim is the greatest possible stability in legal parentage and in everyone’s expectations. These practices are now well developed in the surrogacy industry, particularly in commercial gestational surrogacy.
It is worth noting that, despite the national attention Baby M received, the case did not quickly or directly lead New Jersey to enact a law specifically governing surrogacy. Only thirty years later, in 2018, did the state pass the New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, which expressly recognizes qualifying gestational carrier agreements and establishes a framework under which intended parents become the child’s legal parents at birth.
There are, of course, deeper questions that deserve more attention, just as they did in the media coverage at the time. One is the economic and social divide between surrogates and intended parents. In its March 31, 1987 report on the case, NBC highlighted the contrast in the two sides’ educational and professional backgrounds. Both Sterns held doctoral degrees: William was a biochemist and Elizabeth was a pediatrician. Mary Whitehead had not finished high school, and her husband worked in garbage collection. ABC commentary raised the concern that paid surrogacy could exploit poor women, and argued that it should not become a cottage industry for impoverished women in America. The media also looked at the tension between infertile couples’ desire for children and the interests of birth mothers and children themselves. Gestational surrogacy has eased some of that conflict, but the moral and social questions surrounding surrogacy remain far from resolved.
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